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Abstract
This paper explores the complex economic conditions
that Nicaragua faces at the end of 1988. It focuses, in
particular, on the policy dilemmas that the Nicaraguan
government confronts as domes tic economic conditions
continue to deteriorate, as the prospects of continued war
drag on, and as public opinion begins to associate economic
problems more closely with the government and less closely
with the war. The paper presents a summary of overall
Nicaraguan economic performance since 1979, places it in the
context of the broader Latin American economic crisis over
the same period, and analyzes some of the principal charac-
teristics of the economic model that has evolved under the
Sandinista Front. Special attention is paid to the dramatic
economic policy changes implemented in February and June
1988 and to the changing external assistance levels received
by Nicaragua, especially the rapid increase and then decline
in Soviet economic assistance. Two alternative scenarios for
future economic policy are then explored, one under the
assumption of continued war and economic isolation, the
other under an assumption of a definitive cease fire in the war
and economic reactivation with international assistance.
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The year 1988 has been bittersweetfor the Nicaraguan people. The temporary
cease fire signed in the village of Sapoá on March 23rd has meant an effective
end to the majority of the fighting in the war with the "contras," although sporadic
violations of the cease fire have continued. The willingness of both "contra"
leaders and the government to negotiate raised hopes repeatedly that a definitive
cease fire was near and that peacetime reconciliation and reconstruction would
soon begin. But the continuing failure of those negotiations to produce a
resolution of the military conflict dashed those same hopes. And through it all,
the economic situation has continued to deteriorate.
This paperwill explore the complex economic conditions that Nicaraguafaces
at the end of 1988. It will focus, in particular, on the policy dilemmas that the
Nicaraguan government confronts as the domestic economic conditions continue
to deteriorate, as the prospects of continued war drag on, and as public opinion
begins to associate economic problems more closely with the government and less
closely with the war. Peace may be the most serious challenge that the Sandinista
1 This paper was prepared for presentation at the "Conference on Nicaragua: Prospects for a
Democratic Outcome," sponsored by the Orkand Corporation, October 12 and 13, 1988,
Washington, D.e. It will also be presented at the VII Congreso Centroamericano de Sociologia,
October 10 -15, 1988, Guatemala City. The opinions expressed in this paper reflect solely those
of the author and do not necessarily represent those of either the Orkand Corporation or the
University of Texas.
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Front has faced since 1979; for the latent demand for jobs, higher wages, and
expanded social services is certain to burgeon as soon as there is a definitive
cease fire. Peace with democracy presents a double challenge; for there are
municipal elections 10 be scheduled and new presidential elections will be
expected by 1990. And to enter those elections without dramatic improvements
in economic conditions will threaten the support on which the Sandinista Front
most clearIy relies.
In order to understand the current policy dilemmas, however, it is important
to put the Nicaraguan economy in proper focus. The paper will present a
summary overview of the Nicaraguan economy from 1979 to 1987, induding
discussion of accomplishments, shortcomings, and the consequences of the war.
It will then zero in on the specific problems of 1988, the policy responses
embodied in the government's dramatic shifts in economic policy on February
14th and June 14th of this year and the potential impact of those new policies on
both the fundamental economic problems and on political support for the
government. The paper will close wi tb a discussion of the aIternative future roles
of the Nicaraguan private sector. Western fi nancial institutions, and other parties
in future economic policies under two alternative scenarios: a) continuation of
low-intensitywarfare, and b) a de ¡nitive cease fire and the refocusing of political
force s into the civilian arena.
Tbe Nicaraguan Economy: 1980-87
It would be easy to select individual dimensions of the performance of the
Nicaraguan economy since 1979 and 10 characterize that performance as
"disastrous." The standard of living fuI' the pupulation as a whole, as measured
by real GDP per capita and as illustrated in figure 1, fell by 1987 to a level below
that of 1960. Gross domestic product fell, in per capita terms, by more than 14%
in 1978, the last full year under the Somoza regime, and by more than 25% during
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1979, the year of the Figure 1
overthrow of So moza. From
1980 to 1987, the years for
which the present govern-
ment of Nicaragua can be
held more fully responsible,
growth was strong at first.
But declines in the period
from 1984 to 1987 has left
GDP per capita at 17.2% be-
Iow the 1980 leve1.2 Total
Nicaragua: Real GDP per capita
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Source: Oa8ed OD Bulmer-Thomu. J98i.exports from Nicaragua have
declined in value by 40%
over the same periodo Shortages of imported goods have become acute through-
out the country; and the production of domestically-produced goods that required
imports (everything from clothing to medicines and beer) has al so fallen drama-
tically. Average real wages, according to one source, fell by 1988 to less than 10%
of 1981 Ievels.3 Figure 2 provides year-by-year indication of the changing growth
rates. At the same time, price levels rose in Nicaragua at rapidly escalating rates:
32% per year from 1980 to 1984,334% in 1985,778% in 1986, and, some say, as
2 Measurement of Nicaraguan economic perf ormance since 1980is fairer and more reasonable than
beginning witb eitber 1978 or 1979. To begin witb 19781evels would force the current government
to be effectively responsible for economic performance in 1979, ayear totaIly disrupted by tbe
insurrection, where nearly a fuIl year of economic output was lost. To begin with 1979 levels
would credit tbe present government witb tbe dramatic increases in output that occurred in 1980,
wben compared to 1979, tbat were, at least in part, a relatively natural "rebound" effect.
3 Central America Report, September 2,1988; it is not cIearwbether tbese data refer to industrial
wages, urban wages, or average wages nationwide.
M.E. Conroy: "Nicaragua... Economic Dilemmas of 1988" 9/15/88; Page 4
much as 1500% in 1987.4 Figure 2
Nicaragua's external debt Nicaraguan Economic Growth. 1980-87
al so increased at unparal-
leled rates, from $961 mil-
lion in 1979 to approximately





may, in fact, be simply facile.
The reality of what has been
happening is quite a bit more
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ture, the perennial mainstay of
the Nicaraguan economy pro-
vided the principal impetus for
growth from 1980 to 1983. It de-
clined somewhat from 1984 to
1987 (15 %), as shown in figure 3,
but not by anywhere near the de-
cline in exports; for the Nicara-
guan government has pursued a
deliberate policy of converting
agricultural export acreage into
basic grains production, as part of
the "wartime survival" strategy.
· For 1980 to 1986, taken from Juan Valverde, "La crisis y las distorsiones de la economia
nicaraguense," Boletin Socioeconómico 8 (June-July 1988) p.7; 1987 level taken from El.U








Costa Rica 8.7% -9.5%
El Salvador -6.8% -14.5%
Guatemala -3.1% -20.5%
Honduras 9.6% -14.5%
Source: ECLAC, PreliminaQ' Overview...1987
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For most of the years of recent economic decline, the decreases in exports have
been offset by grants and credits, increasingly from the Eastern European
countries, that permit the government to run substantial deficits. The accumu-
lated debt from this process is the largest in Central America, but it has the lowest
effective debt burden (15%-17% of export income) in all of CentralAmerica (less
than half the burden of Costa Rica, El Salvador, or Panama in comparable years ).5
Comparison with the Rest oí Latin America
Direct comparison ofthe Nicaraguan economicperformancewith that of other
countries in Central America and in the rest of Latín America suggests that
Nicaraguan economic conditions over this period did not differ as greatly as the
separate statistics would seem to imply.
GDP per capita was down by 5.5% for Latin
America as a whole during the same periodo
Mexico and Venezuela incurred decreases
Table 1
Recent Economic Indicators
Nicaragua, Central America, and
Other Latin American Nations
of 10.5% and 20.0%, respectively. The de-
cline in GDP per capita in Nicaragua was
not even the greatest in the Central Ame-
rican region. Table 1demonstrates that Ni-
caragua's overall economic performance
was, in some significant measures, better
than that of Guatemala and comparable to
that of El Salvador and Honduras. There
was no comparable problem, however, with
respect to the rate of inflation.
5 EJU Country Profile 1988-89: Nicara~ua. Costa Rica. and Panama (April 1988), p.27. The
"passive default" that EIU sees embodied in this low debt burden may hinder further credits, but
it is an eff ective strategy under the circumstances; the low burden also reflects the relatively
generous effective terms obtained from the Eastern European creditors.
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marily by export earnings. When Nica-
ragua's exports have expanded in the
past, the economic conditions for the
nation as a whole have generally risen.
When prices or production have fallen,
times have be come very difficult. The
insurrections in Nicaragua and El Sal-
vador may have precipitated the econo-
mic declines in the region as a whole during the early 1980s, and the counter-
revolutionary war in Nicaragua deepened andprolonged the decline. But most
economists are in agreement that, as noted by Zuvekas (a leading USAID ana-
lyst of the region), "the depth and duration of the economic crisis for the regio n
as a whole has been determined primarily by external economic events."6 Falling
prices for Central America's principal exports (coffee, sugar, cattle, and cotton),
high interest rates on debt accumulated in the 1970s 10 counter increases in
petroleum costs, and dramatic reductions in the availability of the international
commercial bank lending that hadfacilitated growth during the 1970s, all affected
Nicaragua as well as the other nations in the region. Table 11 illustrates the
The origins of these economic de-
clines have been studied extensively,
including in the work of the Kissinger
Commission. The Nicaraguan econo-
my, as well as the rest of the Central
American economies, is driven pri-
Table 11
Indices of 1987 Export Volumes, Prices, and
Earnings: Nicaragua, Central America, and
Otber Latin American Nations
(1980 = 100)
Volume Prices Earnings
Latin America 74 99B2

























Source: ECLAC, Preliminary Overview...1987.
6 Clarence Zuvekas, J r., "Central America's Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments; The Outlook
for 1988-2000," a paper presented at the "Symposium on the Future of the Central American
Economies," The University of Texas al Austin, April 20-21, 1988; forthcoming in my edited
volume, Transformation or Continuin¡: Crisis: The Future of the Central American Economies.
Figure 4
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problem faced in the export market. Only Costa Rica, from among the five tradi-
tional Central American nations, managed to increase its export earnings during
the 1980-87 period; but Costa Rica had to increase production by 38% to obtain
a 17% increase in export earnings. Nicaragua experienced a 40% decline in
export earnings over that period, the combined effect of a 17% deeline in prices
for its exports and 27% reduction in the volume of goods produced and export-
ed. By comparison, El Salvador incurred a greater drop in both volume and
prices and, consequently, a greater reduction in export earnings.
International Assistance
Nicaraguan economicperformancewould have been considerablyworse, given
the export conditions it faced, were it not for extensive international assistance
that it received from 1979 through 1987.
In general, Nicaragua received a total of nearly $6.0 billion dollars in credits
and donations from July 1979 through December 1987. This support, an average
of $670 million peryear, ineludes
everything from trade credits to
donations from the World Coun-lnternational Assistance to Nicaragua
Totals. Credits, and Grants dI of Churches. The distribution
across the period since 1979,
however, is far from even. Figure
4 illustrates that distribution.
Nicaragua received the greatest
amount of internationaI assis-
tance in 1985, the year in which
the U .S. imposed the complete
trade embargo. The majority of
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nation). The total division a-
cross major sources of fund-
ing may be seen in Figure 5.
Soviet economic aid (including oil) exceeded $100 million in only two years, 1984
and 1985; and those twoyears account forfully 67% of the $1.6 billion that it has
was in the form of trade cre-
dits from the Soviet Union
($664 million).
Soviet econornic assist-
ance to Nicaragua has been
demonstrably opportunistic.
It has fluctuated widely frorn
year to year. There was no
Soviet assistance prior to
1981 (except a $400,000 do-
Figure 5
lnlernalional AssistancE' to Nicaragua
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donated. In rnost other years, Soviet economic contributions have been in the
range of $50 million to $70 rnillion per year. Total assistance frorn Socialist
countries has arnounted 10 55% of the $6 billion eight-year total, has been more
evenly divided across the years, but has failed to rnaintain Nicaragua's crucial
ability to import needed goods, especially in 1986 and 1987 (see below). There
is ample evidence, albeit largely anecdotal, that the Soviet Union and the other
Eastern European countries have limited their contributions to Nicaragua out of
disagreement with the fundamental model that has evolved. This "short leash"
was "yanked" in 1986, when promised oil shiprnents of 500,000 tons were suddenly
reduced to 300,000 tons. And although cordial cornmentary pervades public
relations with Socialist Bloc countries and support totalling about $300 million
per year for 1988 and 1989 has been announced, the reduction in Socialist Bloc
assistance may be the most important dimension underlying the crises of 1987 and
1988.
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Western countries, lD-
cluding Western Europe, the
U .S., Canada, and other
Latin American countries
contributed the largest
shares of Nicaragua's exter-
nal assistance until 1983. If
multilateral contributions,
dominated by the World
Bank and the Interamerican
Development Bank, are
added to the "Western" con-
tribution, it was not until1984 that Socialist countries contributed a majority of
total external assistance. Western nations and the multilateral institutions have
Figure 6
Nicaraguan "Import Potential": 1980-87
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provided 43% of Nicaragua's total assistance over this period, most of it in the
earlyyears, prior to U.S. intervention in the World Bank and the Inter-American
Development Bank to block further aid.
Nicaragua's external assistance fell greatly after 1985, to less than $520 mil-
lion in 1986 and only $385 million in 1987. If we ignore the fact that much
international assistance is tied to the purchase of specific sets of commodities or
products from specific countries, the sum of total exports and total international
assistance provides a comprehensive measure of Nicaragua's ability, fromyear to
year, to purchase the vast array of imported goods needed for both agricultural
and industrial production. This "import potential" is shown in figure 6. Nica-
ragua's import potential fell in 1986 to less than 80% of the 1982 level, the worst
previous year. By 1987 itfell to nearIy 60% of that level, and less than 40% of the
peakyear, 1985. That may be the single most important measure of the origins of
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the economic crisis of 1988. Nicaragua had exhausted, by the end of 1987, most
of its pos.sibilities for expanded trade credits, most of its possibilities for
sustained external assistance, and most of its possibilities for increasing domestic
production without further expansion of its drastically limited imports.
Tbe Nicaraguan Economic Model.
Nicaragua developed, between 1979 and 1987, a new internal form for
economic organization that is neither prototypical free-enterprise capitalism nor
archetypal Marxist-Leninist central planning. There has been a propensity in the
U.S. media (reinforced by administration opponents of the Nicaraguan
government) to oversimplify what has actually evolved economically by leaping
to conclusions on the basic of the rhetoric of some government officials, rather
than looking at the policies actually implemented. The presence of a strong
central government, dominated by a single political party, and engaged in a
relatively rapid expansion of production in the public sector suggests central
planning. But more than 80% of 1987 agricultural production carne from private
producers (and independent cooperatives); and more than 73% of 1984/85
agricultural exports originated in private farms, ranches, cotton gins and sugar
plants.7
The model that has evolved is closer to that of Peru, Brazil, and Mexico than
it is to Cuba, China, or Vietnam, although it differs from all of them.8 The
Nicaraguan government, for example, redistributed large quantities of agricul-
tural land, mostIy land confiscated from the Somoza family and their closest
7 EIU Country Profile...1988-89, p. 18.
8 For furtber discussion of tbis issue, see "Tbe Nicaraguan Experiment: Cbaracteristics of a New
Economic Model," by Manuel Pastor, Jr., and me, Cbapter 11, pp. 207-225, in Crisis in Central
America: Reiional Dynamics and U.S. Poli¡;y in tbe 1980s (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,
1988).
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business associates. Although some of the confiscated land went into large state
farms, the majority of it has been distributed to fundamentally independent
cooperatives and individual producers. By 1987, only 13% of productive land was
state-owned, a reduction from the 19% state-held in 1985.9 The government has
nationalized most international trade; and the surplus generated in exports and
imports was expected to provide the revenue needed to finance public sector
projects and to protect the standard of living of the poorest segments of the
population. But at the same time the government negotiates continuously with
private agricultural producers to make certain that the profit incentives built into
government prices are adequate to stimulate continued production.1O
The Nicaraguan model differs most from traditional Latin American
development strategies in the attempts that have be en made to subsidize and
protect the standard of living of the poorest portions of the population. From
1979 to 1983 the urban poor benefitted from expanded public employment,
dramatically increased health care services, quadrupling of educational
opportunities, and the provision of large quantities of subsidized basic com-
modities, available through both neighborhood organization and workplace. The
peasantry benefitted from the redistribution of nearly 20% of the total cultivable
land mas s of the country, from increased health and educational services in the
countryside, and from credit and technical assistance for the expansion of both
basic grain and export production.1I
9
l.lllit.
I°It sbould surprise no one tbat under tbese conditions tbe producers are never fully satisfied (at
least in public). Tbe process of negotiation is continuous and cantankerous; any admission by
producers tbat prices were fully satisfactory would bring immediate problems in future
negotiations and pressure from labor unions for bigber wages!
IIFor profiles of tbese programs, including questions about tbeir relative efficiency and
organization, see my edited volume, Nicaraiua: Profiles of tbe Revolutionary Public Sector
(Boulder eo: Westview Press, 1987). As of August 1988 tbe government announced tbat tbe
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One of the early responses to attempts by the government to restrain money
wage increases, substituting increased social services for increased salaries, was
the rapid creation of an expanded "informal" sector comprising a wide range of
activities from black-market speculation in subsidized basic commodities, grey-
market merchandising of imported commodities, and myriad cottage-based
industries producing goods and services in short supply. Some reports have
suggested that up to 60% of the labor force engaged in so me informal sector
activity by 1987. The government has had a profound ambivalence toward this
portion of the population. At times they have been criticized by officials as
"apron-wearing speculators"; at other times government-backed research
institutions have lauded the wealth of basic services they provide.12 The economic
policies adopted in February and June of 1988 had completely opposite effects on
their activities..
Since 1983 government policy has sought to shield both the poor and the
relatively wealthy producers from the full effects of the war. Expansion of the
money supply to expand the economy, burgeoning government expenditures
without significant increases in taxes, reliance upon the "inflation tax" to keep
deficits below otherwise intolerable levels, and a wide variety of direct, albeit
sometimes chaotic, measures to counter momentary imbalances have charac-
terized the economic policies of a government single-mindedly determined to win
the war, even at the cost of severe longer term economic consequences.
"fundamental transformation" undertaken through agrarian reform "had been completed." An
estimated 887,600 hectares had been distributed to 112,000 families. (Central America Report,
XV(August 12, 1988)31.
"Central America Report, Septcmber 2, 1988, citing a new study by the Instituto Nacional de
Investigación Económica y Social.
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The model that has evolved is so far from the free-wheeling free-trade and
free-market policies followed prior to the overthrow of So moza that it is not
surprising that much of the private sector (and the middle class that had been
supported by it) resent the new policies, new institutions, and new directions.13
Whether this model will be sustainable under the inherited economic conditions,
under continuing war, or under a definitive cease fire and a period of reconstruc-
tion is unclear. It is clear that it has been the propensity of the government to
turn to the public sector to fill gaps left by inadequate private sector performance
in recent years. Whether the private sector will emerge from the wartime
economy reinvigorated or defeated is one of the most important economic
questions facing the Nicaraguan economic experiment.
The Economic Impact oí the War
Nicaraguans recognize, perhaps more clearly than most in the U.S., that the
principal objective of the "contra" war has been economic: to damage the
economy directly and indirectly until the government loses capability for
responding to the crisis and loses credibility with its supporters. There is no
doubt that the economic damage from the war has been severe. Public govern-
ment estimates range from $1.5 billion to more than $4 billion (the equivalent of
nearly three years of GDP).
The single greatest cost of the war has been the shift of resources out of
directly productive activities and into government services, both military and
social, in support of the war. Figure 7 illustrates the expansion of government
expenditures in 1983 that corresponded to the rapid expansion of the Sandinista
army, the militias, and the reserve forces to counter the outbreak of the war. By
13Tbis is not to suggest tbat tbe private sector bas been monolitbically opposed to tbe regime or to
many of tbe economic policies; tbe strong --but critical-- support of tbe members of tbe National
Farmers and Cattlemen's Union (UNAG) is an important counterexample. Nor does it suggest
tbat relations betWeen eitber urban workers or peasants and tbe government bas been free of
tension.
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198762% of government ex-
penditures (30.3% of GDP)
was required for defense.
The roots of the 1987-88 in-
flationary crisis lay there.
The additional economic
consequences of the war are
numerous: direct damage to
cri tical facili tieso reduced
agricultural production be-













19BO 19B1 19B2 19B3 19B4 19B5 19B6 19Bí
I
~~--
lID Total Expendit~~ ~ Governmenl~ficit
producers out of the are as
being attacked.14 increasing
scarcity of human resources for directly productive activities as the "best and the
brightest" are recruited into war-related activities. and disruption of investment
decisions in the predominantly private crucial agricultural sectors when the
"contras" target all new investment (from vehicles to structures) for selective
attack.15 The social consequences have also been damaging. The reallocation of
government resources to defense undermined the budgets of most other
ministries; as a result health. education. social security. and housing programs
were all reduced.16 And the targeting by the "contras" of schools. government
health clinics. and social service employees in the field had devastating direct
SOUTt'e: IDO, 11183 Ir. 1118?
14Acreage planted increased by 44% in tbe Spring of 1988, despite severe credit restrictions; tbe
principal causef or tbe increase appears to be tbe ceasefire tbat permitsliterally tens of tbousands
of farmers to return to tbe bilIs and plant.
15For an expanded treatment of tbis subject, see my "Economic Aggression as an Instrument of
Low-Intensity Warfare," in Tbomas W. Walker, editor, Reaaan versus tbe Sandinistas: ~
Undeclared War on Nicaraaua (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 57-79.
16Cf.Harvey WilIiams, "Tbe Social Impact in Nicaragua," in Walker, op.cit., Reaaan versus tbe
Sandinistas pp.247-264.
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impacts on the delivery of government services, especially in the more remote
areas where the conflict was greatest.
The peace prospects created by Sapoá have not alleviated the economic costs
of the war significantIy. No fundamental demobilization will be possible until
there is a definitive cease fire and the removal and relocation of the "contra"
force s or their disarming and re-incorporation. The reduction in the number of
ambushes, firefights, and casualties has been a great relief. And the maintenance
of full military readiness under the reduced levels of conflict is both difficult to
motivate and expensive.
The development model pursued by the Nicaraguan government, to this date,
is one that is peculiarly vulnerable to the kinds of economic damage that the
"contra" war has wrought. That Nicaragua has managed to fight a counterinsur-
gency of the magnitude that has been necessary while sustaining as much
domestically-oriented economic production as it has, may be viewed, in the
kaleidoscope of history, as a remarkable accomplishment. The evolution of the
economic model has been buffeted by international market conditions, by
internal production problems (including the danger, uncertainty, and other
damages brought by the "contra" war), by outside direct and indirect pressures
from allies, and by disapproving noises from analysts in the Socialist bloc of
countries. What was clearest in early 1988 was that it was in crisis, a level of crisis
that required profound remedies.
Tbe Austerity Measures oI 1988
New economic austerity policies introduced in 1988 have diminished the most
important dimensions that separated Nicaraguan economic policy from that of
Peru, Mexico, or Nicaragua's Central American neighbors. The austerity
measures were hailed by the Nicaraguan business community, lessened the
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subsidies to those goods by raising their prices, and set much of the economy free
from earlier attempts to control prices and wages. "For the first time since the
1979 insurrection," according to one group generally supportive of the govern-
ment, "the Nicaraguan government has begun a program of economic reforms
that does not include steps to protect the poor, the social base of the Sandinistas,
from its harshest effects. ,,17 It is to the analysis of these policies that we must now
turno
On February 14th, 1988, the government announced a set of economic
measures that had surprising breadth and profundity. They included:18
. complete remonetization, introducing a new cordoba equal to 1000 of the
old currency; with provisions that required conversion within one week,
documentation of the origin of alllarge amounts of cash, and the temporary
freezing of large savings accounts after conversion to the new currency;
. unification of all exchange rates into a single, drastically devalued (3000%)
new cordoba at the rate of 10 to the dollar;
. an increase in minimum wages of 100% to 300%;
. increased prices and new price controls on 46 basic commodities and a call
for popular action to monitor compliance with the new controls;
. a 10% cut in government budgets and the reorganization of more than 40
government ministries, agencies, and institutions into 8 super-ministries;
and
. reduction of government employment by more than 8,000 jobs.
The policies were modeled on the "heterodox shock" treatments that Brazil
and Argentina pioneered in 1985 and 1986 as means to halt rampant inflation. It
I7Central American Historical Institute Update, 7(July 12, 1988)23: 1.
"Latin American Economic Report, 88-02 (February 29, 1988), p.16.
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was the intent of these policies to correctfor many ofthefundamental imbalances
that existed in the prices of imported goods, to both raise and freeze prices and
wages, and to stimulate additional production. Production for export was the
priority goal, and the devaluation was expected to provide strong new incentives.
The remonetization also served to reduce the money supply by nearly 15%, and
to undermine currency speculators and blackmarketeers, as welI as destroying
the value of the currency carried in the hilIs by the "contras."19
The short term impact was significant reduction in the rate of inflation
(relative to the hyperinflation of the weeks preceding the measures), as the
"campaign against speculation" brought rapid public attention to price
speculators. The subsequent impact was to reduce the availability of many of the
goods previously produced by smalI-scale entrepreneurs; this then worsened the
rate of inflation. The measures were generalIy taken to be anti-business, for the
reduction in money supply reduced the availability of credit; and the popular
mobilization against price increases discouraged production under conditions
when input prices continued to rise or where imported components were now
dramaticalIy more expensive than they had been. Popular support for the
measures, however, was widespread. They reinforced the confidence of the broad
bases of the government's support that the government was capable of taking the
harsh steps needed and that the steps would contain at least token recognition of
the plight of wage earners and poor farmers.
By early June, however, continued shortages of foreign exchange had forced
the black market exchange rate up to 100-to-l; pricesfor basic commodities (even
through the subsidized "secure channel") had risen by more than 600%; and the
political mobilization against price increases hadrizzled. Workstoppages, union-
19See"Tbe New Economic Package --WilI a Popular Model Emerge? ,"~, 7(September 1988)86.
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led demonstrations, and hunger strikes protested the gap between earnings and
the minimum cost of living.
OnJune 14th the government announced anotherfar-reachingset of economic
measures. The new measures were designed to transfer resources from domestic
consumption to export promotion, deliberately reducing domestic demand by
cutting income levels even further. The specific measures included:
. devaluation of the new cordoba from 10-10-1 dollar to 80-to-1, and the
indexing of the exchange rate to the rate of inflation;
. lifting of all price controls from the majority of goods and services, and the
elimination of most of the remaining subsidies from goods distributed
through the "secure channel" (partial subsidies were returned for
government workers and the army in July in lieu of money wage increases);
. increases in pricesfor the goods still controlled: gasoline by 12times, inter-
urban transportation by 6 times, basic grains by two times, etc.;
. freeing of virtually all wages from the standardized national wage scale,
permitting industries to pay in proportion to productivity levels;
. reduction of the flow of credit to large state enterprises and increases in the
availability of credit forprivate producers, with credit rationing 10 the most
productive enterprises, and new credit limits set at 70% of demonstrable
financial need (rather than 100%);
. establishment of positive real rates of interest on savlllgs and credit
through automatic adjustment for price inflation.
The Nicaraguan private sector, shocked by the February measures, was
generally supportive of the June policies. And this was only one of many bases for
concern and suspicion on the part of representatives of the "popular sectors."
Unlike the February measures, the June policies offered little hope for the
majority ofwage earners to protect themselvesfrom price increases on the limited
set of controlled goods orfrom the expected price increases from goods that were
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no longer controlled. The Economics Minister was forced to admit that average
individual worker wages would then cover only 48% of the "minimum market
basket" for a family.20 Other data from normally sympathetic sources suggested
that the average worker's wage would cover as little as 7% of the minimum
basket.21 The last of the pricing mechanisms that had protected the Nicaraguan
population from the full brunt of the region-wide crisis had been dismantled.
Price levels were now expected to approach international levels for many
domestically produced goods, and inflationary pressures were expected to abate
as domestic production responded to the new price incentives.
The policies enacted in February had direct and negative impacts on large
portions of the informal sector. Fixed prices and zealous monitoring of them
removed much of the incentive for informal sector activities. The identification
of informal sector producers as part of the "speculators" against which there
should be "popular mobilization" created one of the strongest social criticisms of
them that had been issued to date. The loss of the informal sector production
contributed directly and rapidly to the inflation thatfollowed the implementation
of the policies.
The policies enacted in June, however, had direct and positive impacts on the
informal sector. In the first place, the liberalizing of wages is expected to reduce
the incentives for people to move out of formal sector jobs and into the informal
sector. As wages rise in other jobs, the least productive part of the informal
sector may be expected to contract. But of even greater importance is the freeing
of prices for the goods and services that are produced by those who continue to
produce on a small scale. Although the credit mechanisms, linking of wages to
20CEntral American Historical Institute Update, 7(July 12, 1988)23, p.2.
21"The New Economic Package...,"~, September 1988.
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productivity, and export incentives will favor larger and more export oriented
producers over the informal sector, the new policies represent, at least implicitly,
a new attitude toward this portion of the economy.
The new measures were criticized as too little and too late. They had come
after most of the annual planting decisions had been made and the time for
planting had passed. They were criticized, both inside Nicaragua and outside, as
representing a dramatic departure from the revolution's fundamental commit-
ments, a veering awayfrom previous goals of "increased popular consumption and
privileged access to basic goods in the countryside.'122 It is expected that the
policies will "transfer resources from internal consumption to export," "transfer
incomefromworkers, consumers, campesinos and small producers... to the public
financial sector, which will then pass it on to the agro-industrial and agro-export
sectors," and "accelerate the fall of real salaries, transferring resources to those
who control capital. ,,23
The Economics Minister, Alejandro MartÍnez Cuenca, responded to many of
these concerns in a lengthy published interview.24 He noted that the principal
obstacles to the efficient development of the export sectorwas "distorted prices,"
"credit giveaways," and the resulting inefficiencies. The context was explicit, he
suggested: "the economy is the Aquiles' heel oí the revolution" in time of war.
The measures have been required "in order to contain inflation, to stimulate a
recovery in production, to make the national economy function in time of war and
12Central America Report, July 8, 1988.
23''Tbe New Economic Package...," ~, Seplember 1988, p.15.
JA"Medidas para domar una economía desbocada," Pensamiento Proprio, VI (July-Augusl1988) 52,
pp.19-23.
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in circumstances where... international support has not been what we wanted it
to be."
When asked whether the impact of the measures was likely to undermine "the
political and social base of the revolution, MartÍnez Cuenca responded that
elimination of price controls on basic commodities would benefit the peasantry
directly, that the elimination of wage control s would lead to higher wages for
urban workers, and that the greatest negative impactwould likelyfall on salaried
workers. He then suggested that it was the deliberate intention of that dimension
of the policies to encourage the shift ofworkers into agricultural production and
to more productive industry and to discourage the continuation of underemploy-
ment in low productivity government jobs. He concluded:
"Everyone is going to have to paya little; everyone is going to have to pay
a part of the [costs of] adjustment. There is no such thing as an operation
that doesn't hurt; but what we have to look for is that the pain is relatively
equally distributed so that it isn't concentrated in one single part of the
body. And that's what is happening."25
Early returns from the implementation of the new policies suggest that they
have not been a panacea. Reports in July suggested that the annual rate of
inflation had fallen to 300%, one fifth of the 1987 level.26 The new cordoba
continued to be devalued, reaching 350 to the dollar by mid-August. Agriculture
appeared headed for a bumper year, both because of the expand~d planting
permitted by the cease fire and because of an abundance of rain. The dollar
shortage remained critical, reflecting the low levels of exports, the lack of hard
currency in aid from the Socialist Bloc and the sharp reduction in Socialist Bloc
support; domestic production of generic medicinal products was reduced to half
26Central America Report, July 8, 1988.
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for lack of foreign exchange to purchase imported components, but replacement
medicine had been sought and obtained from Eastern Europe.27
The economic austerity package of 1988, taken as a whole, represents a set of
policies that may be instructive with respect to future economic policy of the
regime. It constitutes a "return to basics" focused on smaller-scale production
units, new incentives for export production, internationally "realistic" prices,
positive real interest rates as credit-rationing mechanisms, and a relaxation of
controls over most prices and wages. The government has clearly exhausted its
ability to protect its social and political base from the full economic conse-
quences of the broader Latin American economic crisis or of the war.
When faced with the alternative offurther expansion of the state into directly
productive activities and further expansion of state controls or the restoration of
economic incentives for private-sector production, the government has turned,
after vacillating, decisively toward the private sector.28 The ability and willing-
ness of the government to take sweeping measures in this direction also serves to
demonstrate that it is capable of moving forcefully in the opposite direction as
well. If these measures do not result in further tempering of inflation and
reactivation of the private production, the political pressure to return to greater
state participation may prove overwhelming.
27Central America Report, September 9,1988.
18Thenationalization of tbe Ingenio San Antonio, the largest sugar mili in Nicaragua (and in all of
Central America), appears to have been liule more tban a historical footnote to this process. The
mili bad long be en recognized as a site of considerable labor fmanagement strif e (eL SeoU
Whitef ord and Terry Hoops, "Labor Organization and Participation in the Mixed Eeonomy: Tbe
Case of Sugar Production," Cbapter 7, pp. 171-199, in my edited volume, Nieara~ua: Profiles...,
op.eit.). It had become the least effieient of the large sugar milis in tbe country, 30% less tban
comparable milis, and it had undergone a 50% reduetion in production from some of the nations
largest tracts of sugar plantings (7000 hectares). See Central America Report, July 29, 1988.
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The length of time that the government will be able to adhere to this course
would seem to depend on two factors: resolution of the war and the availability
of additional international assistance. And those two factors were linked.
The United Nations has proposed and approved preferential allocation to
Central America of basic development support funds, up to $4.3 billion over the
next three years. The European Economic Community has al so proposed
contributing up to $2 billion over the next five years to Central American
reconstruction and reactivation.29 And the Central American governments,
working through regional organizations such as the Central American Bank for
Economic Integration, have proposed other programs.30 All of these programs are
at least partially contingent upon compliance with the peace process (or peace
processes) underway in the region.
Scenario 1: Continuation oí the War. The lack of a definitive cease fire will
continue to be a major economic burden on Nicaragua; indeed, it now appears
that the principal gain for the "contras," now greatlyweakened and badly divided,
from refusing to sign a definitive cease fire is the continuing damage that they can
afflict upon the economy by not signing. Given the now-admitted elimination of
any possibility for additional military support from the present U.S. administra-
tion, and little prospect for future military support from the U.S. no matter who
wins the November elections, this presents a continuing temptation to the
29Cf.E.V .K. FitzGerald, "The Economic Problems and Prospect of Central America: A View from
Europe," forthcoming in my Transformation or Continuin& Crisis: The Economic Future of
Central America, op.cit.
3OCf.Luis René Caceres, "Central American Programs and Proposals for Economic Reactivation,"
fortbcoming in my Transformation of Continuin~ Crisis..., op.cit.
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Nicaraguan government to bring a decisive end to the conflict so that demobiliza-
tion and reconstruction can begin.
Continuation of the war will decrease the potential positive impact of the
recent policy measures that favored the private sector; it will provide further
incentive for another reversal in economic policy, potentialIy targeted on the
largest, potentialIy most productive, and most vulnerable land holdings in the
central region of the country. Further declines in urban living standards,
especialIy in Managua, if not matched by renewed availability of agricultural
lands may tempt the government to nationalize and redistribute the majority of
the larger farms in the central region that have been untouched to this date.
Continuation of the war willlessen the likelihood that Nicaragua will be able
to turn to Western sources for development assistance, both because of the
worsened prospects for renegotiating outstanding indebtedness and because the
continuing, war-related domestic tension will make support for Nicaragua
politicalIy more difficult for Western governments. The only alternative will be
to meet the conditions implicitly imposed upon further Socialist Bloc assistance,
a modification of the fundamental economic model away from reliance on the
private sector, awayfrom subsidies to the production of the largest and wealthiest
producers, and toward a reorganization of the state along lines more consistent
with Eastern European experience. Even under perestroika it is inconceivable
that further Socialist Bloc support will come to a multi-party, pluralistic, private-
sector-domina ted Nicaragua.
Scenario 2: Definitive Cease Fire and Economic Reactivation. Nicaragua
has surprised many, among supporters and opponents alike, with the flexibility
with which it has ente red into negotiations with the "contras." That process, as
open and as well monitored (presently by the Cardinal Archbishop of Managua
M.E. Conroy: "Nicaragua... Economic Dilemmas of 1988" 9/15/88; Page 25
and the Secretary General of the O.A.S.) as one might hope for, has brought
agreement on most of the original demands raised by "contra" leadership. The
transference of the full process of opposition to the Sandinista Party to civil,
rather than military, political processes must be seen as an immensely compli-
cated and delicate process, even by thosewho believe that processes in Nicaragua
have been far more democratic than the opposition, both civil and military, would
admito
The magnitude and timeliness of Western international assistancewill, again,
playa crucial roleo If Nicaragua is expected to resolve all of the political
difficulties that will come from a cease fire, disarming of the "contras," demobili-
zation of the military reserves, and reactivation of the economy without
substantial new, timely, and flexible international assistance, the probability of
successful transition to a peaceful, open, predominantly private-sector economic
system is, under present economic conditions, very small. Recent economic
policy changes, however, suggest that Nicaragua will be willing to accept and will
be able to utilize new assistance that might be predicated upon continuation of
the reduction oí the central government deficit, maintenance oí "realistic" prices
and interest rates, and continued resurgence oí the private sector.
This would not necessarily represent abandonment oí the íirst principIes oí the
revolution, the commitment to expanded social services, redistribution oí land
and income, diversification oí trade and external assistance, and a commitment
to working class and the peasantry. It would, however, represent a continuation
oí the triumph oí pragmatism over dogmatism that most observers now recognize
has been a hallmark oí the survival oí the Nicaraguan revolution.
